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This paper investigates the effect of aggregate shocks on the fiscal stance of the 
EU, and of its old (OMS) and new (NMS) member states over a business cycle. 
The fiscal stance is measured by the government deficit. To study the impact of 
aggregate shocks, we use impulse responses derived from a pooled structural 
vector autoregression model estimated on annual panel data. We find that the fiscal 
deficits of OMS could be vulnerable to discretionary changes in government 
expenditures and revenues. In contrast, the fiscal stance of NMS shows 
vulnerability to GDP shocks, because the increase in revenues after a positive GDP 
shock is often outpaced by greater expenditure increases in NMS. The estimated 
fiscal vulnerabilities stem from disproportionate policy responses concerning 
government expenditures and a lacking discipline to control pro-cyclical fiscal 
spending. Our findings for the EU thus support application of fiscal rules focused 
on government expenditure rather than other fiscal variables. 
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Responsible and flexible fiscal systems can help countries efficiently respond and 
cope with aggregate shocks, while fostering fiscal sustainability and preserving fiscal space 
for main government programs. 
 
The stability and growth pact (SGP) and the Maastricht criteria are the most relevant 
frameworks concerning fiscal discipline and fiscal stance soundness within the European 
Union (EU) and the Euro Area (EA) (European Commission, 2010; von Hagen et al., 2001). 
With the entry to the EU, the new member countries are obliged to keep their fiscal deficits 
under three percent of GDP within the SGP. As they progress in their integration, the 
prospective EA members need to satisfy the Maastricht criteria.  
 
EU and EA countries, however, are allowed to exercise national discretion in their 
fiscal responses to the shocks they face, particularly in cases of large shocks (European 
Commission, 2010; Orban and Szapary, 2004). The latter could help motivate the country 
variations in fiscal responses during the recent crisis (Spilimbergo et al., 2008). The rules 
versus discretion debate, historically related to monetary policy, is equally relevant for fiscal 
policy. The debate is further set in the context of the different degrees of fiscal stance 
vulnerability across EU countries concerning budget deficit (flow) and government debt 
(stock) positions, their composition, and cyclical and structural components (European 
Commission, 2010; Lane, 2010).   
 
This paper investigates the impacts of aggregate shocks on the fiscal stance of EU 
countries, including by looking into the differences in the shocks’ impacts across the OMS 
and NMS over a business cycle. The motivation for contrasting the old and new EU members’ 
fiscal stance vulnerability to aggregate shocks comes from numerous observations in the 
literature that the new, less developed members may have generally worse institutional and 
governance frameworks, lower fiscal discipline, capacity and technical skills, less effective 
automatic stabilizers, and greater structural deficits and output volatility (Coricelli, Ercolani, 
2002; Orban and Szapary, 2004; Zapal and Schneider, 2006; Cihak and Fonteyne, 2009; EC, 




The aggregate shocks of interest include macroeconomic shocks, such as the terms of 
trade, GDP and CPI inflation shocks; the financial shock, approximated by unexpected 
changes in the interest rate; and fiscal shocks, namely the discretionary changes in 
government expenditures and revenues. To analyze the fiscal response to these aggregate 
shocks, this paper estimates a pooled structural vector autoregression (PSVAR) model 
encompassing basic macroeconomic, financial and fiscal variables using a data panel for EU 
countries. The estimated pooled SVAR model is then used to derive impulse response 
functions (IRFs) and study the dynamic responses of the fiscal variables, such as government 
expenditures, revenues and the budget deficit, to shocks identified by the model.   
 
We find that the fiscal stance (deficits) of OMS (EA12) could be relatively more 
vulnerable to government expenditure and revenue shocks compared to new NMS (EU12).
1
  
Namely, the OMS finance discretionary expenditures by further debt accumulation, instead 
through revenues, and engage in excessive spending after revenue windfalls. On the other 
hand, the fiscal stance in NMS shows vulnerability to a GDP shock, because the increase in 
revenues after positive GDP shock is often outpaced by greater expenditure increases in 
NMS. The estimated vulnerabilities appear to stem from a disproportionate policy response, 
mostly on the government expenditure side, and a lacking discipline to diminish pro-cyclical 
fiscal spending. 
 
Our paper fits into the literature analyzing the cyclicality and effects of fiscal policy in 
the EU. Recently, probably due to the impact of the financial and economic crisis, the 
dynamics of government budgets has been intensively analyzed in both academic and policy 
literature. Since the role of fiscal policy in a monetary union is crucial, a significant bulk of 
recent research focused on the EA. The contributions by Fatas and Mihov (2003) and Gali and 
Perotti (2003) are the cornerstones of the contemporary analysis of fiscal policy. In line with 
our results, Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2011) show that fiscal deficits is a potential source of 
idiosyncratic macroeconomic fluctuations in the EU. This is because individual fiscal 
policies, reflecting national priorities, may become a potential source of asymmetric shocks 
and hinder the performance of monetary policy in a monetary union, such as the EA. 
                                                 
1
 The EA12 countries include Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. EU12 countries include Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Estonia, 




Using an estimated DSGE model for the EA, Ratto et al. (2006) find empirical 
evidence for systematic countercyclical fiscal policy in the EA, and argue that fiscal policy 
can be effective in stabilizing GDP in the presence of demand and supply shocks. Turrini 
(2008) analyzes the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy in the EA countries and concludes that 
the average stance of fiscal policy is expansionary when output is above potential, thus 
denoting a pro-cyclical bias in good times. This finding supports our empirical evidence on 
the pro-cyclical character of fiscal policy in the EU, and in the NMS in particular.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the 
employed data and their sources. Section three describes the applied model and estimation 
methodology. Section four discusses the estimation results for the EU as a whole, and then 
separately for the pools of the old and new member states. Section five concludes. 
2. Data Description 
 
The data series for EU countries employed in our study were obtained from the 
AMECO database, except for the interest rate series. The latter was taken from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistic and, for Bulgaria and Romania, supplemented by authors’ 
calculation based on national and IMF country desk information for the years preceding 2000. 
The frequency of the data series is annual covering the period 1993-2010. The detailed data 
description and sources are provided in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 Here] 
 
  
The real GDP is constructed from the nominal GDP and the GDP deflator. The long-
term real interest rate is obtain for most countries from the Eurostat, except for Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic and Estonia for which it is taken from IMF IFS; Romania and Slovenia for 
which it is taken from the ECB database; and Slovakia for which it is taken from the OECD 
database. For the purpose of estimation, all variables are in logs. Table A1 in the Appendix 





3. Model and Estimation Methodology 
 
We use a pooled vector autoregression (PVAR) model to estimate the impact of 
aggregate shocks on fiscal variables and other main macroeconomic fundamentals within the 
EU. The PVAR relates the macroeconomic and fiscal variables of interest to their lagged 




i t j i t j i t i t it
j
A x A x t   

      (1) 
where 
, , , , , , ,,( , ,, ) ,,i t i ti t i t i t i t i tINF R REx TT EXP GD VP   ,i tx  is the vector of endogenous variables 
including the percentage change in the terms-of-trade index, the (log of) real government 
expenditures (EXP ), GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars (GDP), the inflation rate     
( INF ), nominal interest rate (R ), and government revenues (REV ).  
 
The main focus of the paper is on budget deficits and EXP  and REV , and we include 
GDP, inflation and interest rates in the vector of endogenous variables as controls for other 
macroeconomic conditions and to identify macroeconomic and financial shocks of interest. 
This set of variables includes all the conventional macroeconomic variables typically included 
in macroeconomic models (see Monacelli (2005), Linde et al (2009), and Adolfson (2001), 
among others). The parameters i  and t  are country and year fixed-effects that capture long 
run differences in all the variables across countries, and the impact of global factors that are 
common to all countries in the sample and can be understood as the world business cycle. The 
coefficient 
ig  captures a country-specific trend. The residual term  ,i t  corresponds to an 
error term that is assumed to be i.i.d ~ (0,
 
 ).  
 
The number of lags, q , is set to two. This is despite the indication of the conventional 
lag length selection criteria (Akaike and Schwartz information criteria) that one lag could be 
optimal for the VAR at hand. To ensure a satisfactory diagnostic of the estimated residuals, 
specifically to reduce their autocorrelation, we find that the VAR(2) specification is more 
appropriate in our case.
2
 The model parameters are contained in matrices jA , and the 
                                                 
2
 We do not report the results here to save space. However, they are available from the authors upon request. We 
test the implications of this modeling choice for our baseline estimation results in the robustness analysis. 
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structural interpretation of the results depends on the identification of the parameters of the 
contemporaneous matrix 0A . Although we are interested in analyzing the impulse response 
function for the government deficit, we do not include it explicitly as a variable into the 
model. The model includes logs of expenditures and revenues, which are by definition always 
positive. The logged government deficit is constructed based on the dynamics of the two 
variables and their steady state (average) shares in the deficit in the studied countries.  
 
The main identification assumption imposes a diagonal structure on the 0A  matrix. 
This implies that the terms of trade respond to other macroeconomic variables only with a lag. 
This is a conventional assumption implying that all countries in our sample are small open 
economies and price takers in international trade. Further, output, inflation, interest rates and 
revenues respond contemporaneously to changes in expenditures, but government 
expenditures respond to changes in a country’s macroeconomic conditions and fiscal revenues 
only after a year.  Similarly, revenues are assumed to respond contemporaneously to changes 
in expenditures, GDP, inflation, and interest rates, but these variables respond to shocks to 
revenues only with a one year lag.  
 
The assumptions on the ordering of fiscal variables relative to GDP are similar to 
those in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Ilzetzki et al. (2010), but the use of annual data 
makes them more controversial. Although one may reasonably argue that expenditures are 
planned on an annual basis and do not respond to a contemporaneous quarterly innovations in 
GDP, assuming that they do not respond to innovations to GDP within the calendar year could 
be more extreme. We will assess this ordering assumption and its implications for our results 
in the robustness analysis.    
 
The ordering of inflation and interest rates relative to output also follow the standard 
ordering in the monetary policy literature (Christiano et al., 1998). The identification 
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The model described in equation (1) corresponds to a PVAR, because we assume that 
the dynamics, represented by the different parameters and matrices, are common across the 
different cross-sectional units (countries) included in the estimation, which are indexed by i . 
This is a standard assumption in this literature (see Broda (2004); Uribe and Yue (2006)) 
because, given the length of the time series dimension of the data (around 20 annual 
observations), it is not possible to estimate country-specific dynamics unless we reduce 
importantly the number of exogenous shocks under consideration, the number of lags, or both. 
However, as noticed by Robertson and Symons (1992), and Pesaran and Smith (1995), this 
assumption may lead to obtaining coefficients that underestimate (overestimate) the short 
(long) run impact of exogenous variables if the dynamics differ importantly across countries.  
 
We estimate the parameters of equation (1) by SURE
3
, assuming the data series of the 
PVAR are trend stationary in levels. The performed panel unit root test reported in Table A2 
supports this hypothesis. An exception is the possible non-stationary behavior of the GDP 
series. We address this issue in our robustness analysis by estimating the model including 
GDP growth. It has to be emphasized, however, that even though we employ the panel data 
unit root tests, a test of whether a series is stationary still relies on the time-series dimension. 
Our panel is rather short in this respect, at about 20 observations of annual data on average. 
Therefore, unit root tests with the null hypothesis of stationarity lack the size to confirm the 
null, and tests with the null of non-stationarity lack the power to reject the null in such a small 
time-series sample. Overall, what matters is that the residuals of the estimated PVAR are 
                                                 
3
 The use of SURE is standard for the estimation of the reduced form equation. It is equivalent to estimating the 
model equation by equation by OLS, but is more efficient because it takes into account contemporaneous 
correlations among variables. It also directly estimates the variance-covariance matrix of reduced-form residuals. 
We use only the two-step version of the estimator for reasons of speed, but when iterated until convergence the 
SURE estimators are equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimators.     
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stationary and well behaved. The latter is confirmed based on the results reported in Figure 
A1 in the Appendix.  
 
The estimated PVAR and its parameters are then used to recover the impulse-response 
functions (IRFs) of the endogenous variables in equation (1) to the structural shocks of 
interest, using the variance-covariance matrices of reduced form errors derived from these 
coefficients. The confidence bands for the IRFs come from parametric bootstrapping on the 
model assuming normally distributed reduced form errors. The constructed IFRs are with 
respect to shocks of one standard deviation, i.e. shocks of the same probability and not 
necessarily of the same size. 
4. Discussion of Estimation Results 
 
4.1. The EU Estimation Results 
 
Table 2 reports the PVAR reduced-form estimates. All variables show significant 
positive autocorrelation (persistence), with the GDP one being the highest (0.877), and the 
one of the government expenditure being the lowest (0.292). Except for inflation and the 
interest rate, the second autocorrelation is negative for all variables. One may thus reasonably 
expect that GDP will show the most persistent impulse responses to shocks. In accord with 
the identification assumption, the terms of trade dynamics, in column one of Table 2, is not 
influenced by other domestic variables.  
 
Government expenditures and the remaining variables in the system are, in addition to 
their lagged values, significantly influenced by other variables in the system. Their effects at 
the first and second lags go often in opposite directions, so it is useful to look at their long-run 
effect, i.e. when setting the pertinent lag operators to one. Government expenditures are 
affected by the terms of trade, ,i tTT , in a negative way as the second lag negative influence 
dominates in the long run. The long-run effect of inflation on government expenditure is also 
negative due to the negative second lag coefficient.  
 
GDP is significantly influenced by government expenditure, suggesting a crowding-
out effect at the first lag. Also inflation influences GDP with opposite effects at the first and 
second lag, where the magnitude of the second lag coefficient determines the inflation’s 
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negative effect on GDP in the long run. Consistent with a potential crowding-out effect on 
GDP and thus aggregate demand, government expenditure also affect negatively inflation at 
the first lag. Also the terms of trade are estimated to have a negative effect on inflation at the 
second lag. On the other hand, GDP (at the second lag) and government revenues (at the first 
lag) have positive effects on inflation, as rising aggregate demand pushes inflation up and 
increases in taxes or tax rates can have a complementing positive cost-push effect on 
inflation. 
 
Government revenues are, in the long run, positively influenced by the terms of trade, 
GDP as well as the interest rate. The interest rate is influenced significantly and in a positive 
manner by the terms of trade. Finally, government revenues are negatively affected by 
government expenditures and inflation, and positively influenced by GDP, in the long run. 
Overall, the terms of trade, government expenditure, GDP and inflation appear to be the most 
significant drivers of the system’s dynamics. The PVAR reduced-form estimates 
predetermine the direction and shape of the impulse response functions (IRFs) that we discuss 
next. 
 
[Table 2 Here] 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the estimated impulse response functions (IRFs) of the government 
deficit, government expenditure and government revenue to shocks that the model identified 
from data based on its structure and coefficient estimates. The mean IRFs are depicted by a 
solid line and their corresponding one-standard-deviation confidence intervals by dashed 
lines. We do not report the IRFs for the remaining endogenous variables for the sake of 
brevity, but these estimates are available from the authors.  
 
Consider the first row of Figure 1 which shows the IRFs of the government deficit to 
the terms of trade shock, the government expenditure shock (the discretionary changes in 
government expenditure), the GDP shock, the CPI inflation, the interest rate shock, and the 
government revenue shock (the discretionary changes in government revenue). We find that 
government deficits of the EU countries respond significantly to shocks in the terms of trade, 
government expenditure, GDP, the interest rate and government revenues. In contrast, the 
deficit response to the CPI shock is insignificant. We will now discuss the IRFs of 
government deficits in the EU to each shock of interest in more detail, including by looking 
10 
 
into the IRFs of government expenditures and revenues to the shocks. We do so by 
considering each column of Figure 1 in turn.   
 
[Figure 1 Here] 
 
Consider the first column of Figure 1. A positive terms of trade shock induces increase 
in government revenues and only an insignificant and short-lived increase in government 
expenditures. The contained response of the expenditures, on the back of increasing revenues, 
allows for a decline in the government deficit by about 5 percent from the initial (steady state) 
level.    
 
The second column of Figure 1 shows that, the discretionary increase in government 
expenditures (the shock) seems to be to some extent financed by rising government revenues. 
This revenue financing is not big enough, however, to fully offset the discretionary increase in 
expenditures. Namely, EU countries accumulate, on average, significant deficits (increasing 
by about 11 percent) because the increase in their expenditures is about two times bigger than 
the revenue increase. Discretionary increases in government spending can thus pose a major 
challenge for sustainable fiscal stance.   
 
A positive GDP shock increases government revenues in EU countries by about 18 
percent from their initial levels. This revenue increase is significantly greater than the amount 
by which EU countries raise their expenditures in boom times. This ensures that the positive 
GDP shock lowers government deficits in EU countries. Nevertheless, one can observe that 
the expenditure increase in response to rising revenues is still large, and raises a question 
about whether more savings for rainy days could be achieved by EU governments when faced 
with transitory revenue windfalls.    
 
Government revenues decline significantly after an inflationary shock (fourth column 
of Figure 1) as the input price increase holds back production, and more expensive final 
consumption could pull back also consumer expenditure. This decline in revenues occurs in 
spite of the possible positive effect of increasing prices on revenues in EU countries with 
progressive income tax schemes. Perhaps also in light of this development, EU governments 
reduce their expenditures after an unexpected increase in inflation, producing an insignificant 




Consider the second last column of Figure 1. After a positive interest rate shock, 
government revenues tend to decline with about five year lag but rather insignificantly. 
Nevertheless, in combination with the estimated significant (transitory) increase in 
government expenditure, as a result of the increased debt servicing cost, the estimated impact 
of the interest rate shock on the deficit is significantly positive. Namely, the interest rate 
shock causes government deficits to increase, on average in the EU, by about ten percent from 
their initial levels. 
 
Finally, as shown in the last column of Figure 1, a discretionary increase in 
government revenues raises government revenues, as expected, by about 10 percent from their 
initial levels. At the same time, EU countries manage to contain their expenditures to rise only 
temporarily and insignificantly in the medium term. This helps the EU governments achieve 
lowering of government deficits by about 10 percent.  
 
4.2. Robustness Analysis 
 
When testing the robustness of our baseline results, we first turn to assessing the 
implications of the possible unit root in the GDP data series. This possibility has been 
indicated by the results of panel data unit root test in Table A2. For this, we replace the log of 
GDP level in equation (1) by the first difference of the logarithm. We re-estimate the PVAR 
and compare the derived IRFs to the baseline ones. The results are reported in Figure A2 in 
the Appendix.  
 
We find no material implication of using GDP growth instead of GDP level for our 
baseline results. The only two minor exceptions are: (i) the response of government revenues 
to the terms of trade shock that changes from significantly positive to insignificant, and (ii) 
the response of government expenditure to the government revenue shock stays positive but 
increases in significance. Neither of the two have any implication for the results concerning 
the estimated responses of government deficit. This finding can be explained by at least three 
trends being present in the PVAR, including the deterministic time trend, were just one is 
enough to detrend any left-had side variable that could have a trend included in it. Taking the 
trend out of the GDP before the PVAR estimation, by differencing, may thus have no 
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implication on what is happening in the model. This interpretation is consistent with our 
finding.   
 
Second, given that the conventional lag selection criteria indicated optimal choice of 
one lag for the VAR, we test the robustness of our baseline results based on two lags next. We 
reestimate the PVAR with one lag and report the resulting IRFs in Figure A3 in the Appendix. 
The results are not materially different from those obtained with two lags. The only noticeable 
difference is the short-lived negative impact of the terms of trade on the budget deficit (first 
column, first row of Figure A3), compared with the significant negative response of the 
budget deficit to the terms of trade shock in the baseline estimation. 
 
Third, we assess the robustness of our baseline results to the chosen ordering and 
shock identification structure. Here, we are most concerned with the robustness of our results 
to different ordering of the government revenues. As discussed in Section 3, the prevailing 
practice in the literature to order revenues after expenditures and GDP may be questioned in 
the case of annual data, because changing revenues can influence government expenditure 
within the fiscal year. This can happen, for instance, if the government experiences significant 
revenue shortfall in the first half of the year, revises its revenue forecast downwards, and call 
for a midyear budget revision. Indeed, many countries have this possibility and have followed 
this procedure in the past. 
 
We thus change the ordering of the variables so that government revenues are ordered 
before GDP and government expenditures, making it possible for them to influence both GDP 
and expenditures contemporaneously. We re-estimate the PVAR by SURE and construct the 
resulting IFRs, which are reported in Figure A4 in the Appendix. There are two material 
implications of the change in ordering, namely, for the responses of government deficit to the 
GDP and government revenue shocks: (a) note that the IRF of the government deficit to the 
GDP shock becomes insignificant by comparing the IRFs plotted in the first row, third 
column of Figure A4 and of Figure 1. This insignificance arises because, under the alternative 
ordering of variables, the positive response of government revenues to the GDP shock is 
much weaker relative to the response of government expenditures to the GDP shock. When 
investigating origins of the change in the estimation result further, we find that it is the 




(b) note that the response of government deficit to the revenue shock changed its 
direction and became significantly positive, as opposed to significantly negative as in our 
baseline results. Compare the IRFs plots in the first row, last column of Figure A4 and of 
Figure 1. While the IRF of government revenue increases about twofold under the alternative 
ordering, the IRF of government expenditure increases several folds and becomes highly 
significant. When investigating origins of the change in estimation results, we find that 
ordering the government revenues before government expenditures drives this change, not the 
ordering of government revenues before GDP.  
 
Overall, the alternative ordering of government revenues has a material effect on two 
out of six results of our interest. Note that our finding that the reordering matters gives us 
some assurance that there is enough information in the data to credibly identify and 
distinguish our aggregate shocks of interest. Nevertheless, for the two result materially 
affected by the reordering, we may need to be cautious in our interpretations of the IRFs. 
Qualifications are thus warranted concerning periods of uncertain revenues and substantial 
fiscal austerity measures, i.e. typically in severe (abnormal) downturns of the business cycle. 
We believe that our baseline ordering is still more appropriate for the purpose of our study 
that is to investigate fiscal responses and stance over a business cycle rather than in times of 
crises. In other words, we focus on times when countries exercise less fiscal discretion and 
adhere more to the rules of their fiscal frameworks.   
   
4.3. Comparing the Pools of Old (OMS) and New (NMS) EU Member States  
  
A number of studies in the literature made the observation that the fiscal frameworks 
of the OMS and NWS still differ significantly despite increased efforts for their 
harmonization. Some studies refer to the scarcity of technical skills necessary for 
implementation of advanced fiscal frameworks and issues with budgetary planning as major 
challenges particularly in some NMS (EC, 2010, p. 104, 114). Other studies refer to lower 
fiscal discipline, and higher structural deficit and output volatility as the challenges for the 
NMS in meeting the Maastricht fiscal criterion (Cihak and Fonteyne, 2009, p. 22-23, 
Coricelli, Ercolani, 2002).  
 
Further, Orban and Szapary (2004) argue that NMS may not be able to rely so much 
on automatic stabilizers to smooth their budget throughout the cycle. On the other hand, the 
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OMS have a higher tax burden with progressive income taxation, a high degree of spending 
because the welfare state is more developed, and also public indebtedness is higher (Mara, 2012). 
Zapal and Schneider (2006) discuss fiscal policy positions of the NMS and OMS and argue 
that the two groups of countries differed in the vigor with which they controlled spending 
programs (notably public employee compensation), indicating that NMSs performed worse 
comparing to the OMS. This could suggest that the OMS and NMS as groups can have 
distinct capacity to respond and cope with aggregate shocks using their fiscal policy. 
 
To complement the evidence from the literature on the possible differences across the 
OMS and NMS, in the areas of public governance and fiscal discipline, we plot the 
development of government effectiveness from the Worldwide Governance Indicators and the 
European Commission’s Fiscal Rule Index for selected 12 NMS and 12 OMS (see Table A1 




 percentiles of the 
cross-country distribution for each of the groups over time. 
 
[Figure 2 Here] 
 
Government effectiveness seems to have been generally greater in the OMS than 
NMS, though significance of this difference has diminished as of 2006. This is owing to the 
notable decline of the lower (25
th
) percentile of the OMS’s cross-country distribution, as 
government effectives of the underperformers among the OMS (Greece, Italy, Spain) has 
further deteriorated. Fiscal discipline has been generally higher in the OMS compared with 
the NMS, based on the relative development of the fiscal rule index for NMS and OMS. 
Nevertheless, this difference does not seem to be significant due to the overlap of the 
overperformers from the NMS and underperformers from the OMS.  
 
Based on the above motivation, we find it interesting to investigate the differences in 
fiscal response to and coping with aggregate shocks between NMS and OMS. Due to data 
availability constraints, we focus on the selected groups of EA12 (OMS) and EU12 (NMS) 
countries, as listed in Table A1 in the Appendix. We reestimate the PVAR model for the 
EA12 and EU12 groups and derive the resulting IRFs. Figure 3 shows the comparison of IRFs 
of government deficit, expenditure and revenue to the structural shocks identified by the 
estimated SPVARs for EA12 and EU12 countries.  The impulse responses for EA12 are 
depicted by the solid lines with their one-standard-deviation confidence intervals described by 
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the associated dashed lines. The IRFs for EU12 are then described by the circle lines where 
again the solid circle line depicts the mean response and the dashed circle lines show the 
associated confidence intervals. A significant difference in IRFs occurs when the IRFs, and 
their confidence intervals for, EA12 and EU12 countries do not overlap. 
 
Consider for instance the first column of Figure 3 which describes the impact of the 
terms of trade shock on the fiscal variables of interest. Since, in the second and third panel, 
the bands delineated by the IRF confidence intervals overlap we can concur that there is no 
significant difference between the EA12 and EU12 in the responses of government 
expenditures and revenues to terms of trade shocks. However, the responses of EA12 and 
EU12 deficits to the term of trade shock show a significant difference. While, for the EU12, 
both the response of government expenditures and revenues to the terms of trade shock is not 
different from zero, for the EA12, the response of revenues is significantly positive. As a 
result, after a positive terms of trade shock, the EA12 countries on average reduce their 
deficits, while the EU12 countries’ deficits remain unaltered.   From now on we will discuss 
only the IRFs in Figure 3 for which we find significant differences between the EA12 and 
EU12.  
 
Consider the second column of Figure 3, namely the last panel in that column, which 
shows significantly higher response of government revenues in EU12 than in EA12 after a 
discretionary increase in government expenditure (shock). Consequently the first panel of that 
column shows greater increase in government deficit in response to the government 
expenditure shock. This can lead to a conjecture that discretionary increases in government 
expenditure are financed to a significant extent by increases in government revenues in EU12 
countries, whereas, in EA12 countries, they are financed by new borrowings (debt). This 
could make the EA12 countries’ fiscal stance more vulnerable to government expenditure 
shocks. 
 
The IRFs in the third column suggest that a positive GDP shock increases revenues 
more prominently in EU12 than in EA12 (last panel). However EU12 tends to raise their 
government expenditures in view of increasing income while EA12 uses the increased 
revenues to significantly decrease their fiscal deficits and improve the fiscal stance. This 
results in a significantly different dynamics of fiscal deficits in the EA12 and EU12 after a 




[Figure 3 Here] 
 
Consider now the fourth column which, in the last panel, shows that the responses of 
government revenue to an inflation (supply) shock differ significantly across the EA12 and 
EU12. Namely, as prices increase in the EA12, so do the revenues because the tax base 
presumably increases as well. On the other hand, in the EU12, the price shock propagates as a 
negative supply shock, lowering the economy’s income, the tax base and government 
revenues. Despite these contrasting differences in the reaction of revenues, the fiscal deficit 
does not respond significantly to the shock in either of the two country groups. This is mainly 
due to a counterbalancing decrease in government expenditures in EU12, and a great 
uncertainty about the response of government expenditures in EA12.  
 
Since there are no significant differences detected by our estimates in regards to the 
response of the fiscal variables to an interest rate shock, we proceed with discussing the 
impact of the government revenue shock. These impacts are described in column six. The 
corresponding IRFs suggest that, after a discretionary increase in (one-standard deviation 
shock to) government revenues, the EA12 increase their government expenditure, while EU12 
tend to decrease their government expenditures. This results in significantly greater reduction 
of government deficits in EU12 than in EA12. For the EA12, this positive effect of lowering 
government deficit is neutralized in the medium term, as the cumulative impact on the fiscal 
deficit returns to zero. This indicates vulnerability of the fiscal stance in EA12 countries to a 
positive revenue shock. 
 
Overall, we find that the fiscal stance of EA12 could be relatively more vulnerable to 
discretionary changes in government expenditures and revenues compared to EU12. This is 
because of the EA12 inability to finance discretionary expenditure increases by revenues and 
the excessive expenditure responses after revenue windfalls. On the other hand, the fiscal 
stance in EU12 could be relatively more vulnerable to a GDP shock. The estimated 
vulnerabilities could stem from a disproportionate policy response mostly on the government 
expenditure side and a lacking discipline in regards to containing pro-cyclical fiscal spending. 
This could provide an argument for advocating fiscal rules focused on government 





This paper studied the impact of macroeconomic, financial and fiscal shocks on 
government revenues, expenditures and deficits of the OMS and NMS of the EU. The study 
was carried out with the use of estimated pooled SVAR model on EU countries panel data.  
 
We found that government revenues increase after the terms of trade, government 
expenditure, GDP and government revenue shocks. In contrast, they tend to decline after the 
price shock. The EU countries get into deficit positions after a discretionary increase in 
government expenditure despite some financing of this increase from additional government 
revenues. This is because the increase in their expenditures is about two times bigger than the 
additionally raised revenues. On aggregate, the EU countries are able to raise more revenues 
after a positive GDP shock while limiting their expenditures. This ensures that the positive 
GDP shock lowers government deficits in the EU. Similarly, a discretionary increase in 
government revenues tends to be accompanied by restrained fiscal expenditures, and this 
helps lower government deficits. However, after a positive interest rate shock, the 
combination of an increase in government expenditure with declining revenues in the 
medium-term makes the deficit grow significantly.  
 
When comparing the responses of fiscal variables for the OMS and the NMS of the 
EU, we find that the fiscal stance of the OMS could be relatively more vulnerable to 
government expenditure and revenue shocks compared with the NMS. Further, we find OMS’ 
vulnerability to expenditure shocks. It appears that discretionary increases in government 
expenditure could be financed by new borrowings (debt) as opposed to additional revenue 
collection, and this worsens OMS’ fiscal stance. Moreover, our results reveal OMS’ 
vulnerability to fiscal revenue shocks. It arises because the OMS increase their government 
expenditure after a discretionary increase in government revenues.  
 
On the other hand, the fiscal stance in the NMS could be relatively more vulnerable to 
a GDP shock, as the resulting increase in revenues is often outpaced by greater expenditure 
increases in the NMS. The estimated vulnerabilities could stem from a disproportionate policy 
response, mostly on the government expenditure side, and lacking discipline to restrain pro-
cyclical fiscal spending. Our findings for the EU thus support application of fiscal rules 
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Table 1: Employed Data Series and Their Sources 
Variable Source Notes 
Terms of Trade Terms of trade goods and services  year 2000=100 
Government 
Expenditures 
Total expenditure: general government Mrd EUR; ESA 1995 
Government Revenue Total revenue: general government Mrd ECU/EUR; ESA 1995 
Nominal GDP 




Price deflator gross domestic product at 
market prices 
year 2000 = 100 
CPI 
Harmonised consumer price index (All-
items) 
year 2005 = 100 
Interest Rate 
long term real interest rate >5 years, 
various sources 
Eurostat, IMF IFS, Haver 
Analytics, Bloomberg, ECB, 
OECD 






Table 2: Estimated Reduced-Form VAR for the EU  
 
 
,i tTT  ,i tEXP  ,i tGDP  ,i tINF  ,i tR  ,i tREV  
, 1i tTT   
0.554 0.127 -0.037 0.073 7.155 0.108 
(0.050)*** (0.178) (0.133) (0.048) (1.400)*** (0.157) 
, 1i tEXP 
 
0.000 0.292 -0.179 -0.047 0.441 -0.138 
(0.000) (0.082)*** (0.060)*** (0.022)** (0.627) (0.072)* 
, 1i tGDP 
 
-0.000 0.413 0.877 -0.033 -0.498 0.397 
(0.000) (0.123)*** (0.090)*** (0.033) (0.936) (0.108)*** 
, 1i tINF 
 
-0.000 0.545 0.241 0.342 -2.007 0.489 
(0.000) (0.198)*** (0.145)* (0.053)*** (1.506) (0.174)*** 
, 1i tR   0.000 0.011 -0.002 0.002 0.335 0.005 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) (0.063)*** (0.007) 
, 1i tREV 
 
0.000 0.066 0.086 0.068 -0.316 0.530 
(0.000) (0.105) (0.077) (0.028)** (0.798) (0.092)*** 
, 2i tTT   -0.205 -0.408 -0.021 -0.097 -3.185 -0.217 
 (0.053)*** (0.181)** (0.135) (0.049)** (1.423)** (0.159) 
, 2i tEXP 
 
-0.000 -0.062 -0.088 -0.014 -0.725 -0.121 
(0.000) (0.086) (0.063) (0.023) (0.655) (0.076) 
, 2i tGDP 
 
0.000 -0.259 -0.094 0.079 1.696 0.027 
(0.000) (0.129)** (0.094) (0.035)** (0.980)* (0.113) 
, 2i tINF 
 
-0.000 -0.645 -0.528 0.004 -0.396 -0.587 
(0.000) (0.162)*** (0.119)*** (0.044) (1.236) (0.143)*** 
, 2i tR   
-0.000 0.015 0.001 -0.000 0.093 0.005 
(0.000) (0.009)* (0.007) (0.002) (0.068) (0.008) 
         
-0.000 0.121 -0.094 -0.026 -0.590 -0.211 
(0.000) (0.108) (0.080) (0.029) (0.826) (0.095)** 
Source: Authors’ calculation. Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; we do not report the coefficient 








Figures (Main Text) 
Figure 1: Cumulative Impulse Responses based on PSVAR Estimated for the EU 
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Figure 2: Government Effectiveness (left panel) and Fiscal Discipline (right panel) in EU12 and EA12 
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Figure 3: Comparison of Cumulative IRFs for the Old and New EU Member Groups 
 












































































-5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10
-5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10
-5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10
Govt. Deficit,      Terms of Trade Govt. Deficit,     Govt. Expenditure Govt. Deficit,    GDP Govt. Deficit,   CPI Govt. Deficit,  Interest Rate Govt. Deficit, Govt. Revenue
Govt. Expenditure,      Terms of Trade Govt. Expenditure,     Govt. Expenditure Govt. Expenditure,    GDP Govt. Expenditure,   CPI Govt. Expenditure,  Interest Rate Govt. Expenditure, Govt. Revenue
Govt. Revenue,      Terms of Trade Govt. Revenue,     Govt. Expenditure Govt. Revenue,    GDP Govt. Revenue,   CPI Govt. Revenue,  Interest Rate Govt. Revenue, Govt. Revenue
IRB_EA12_logirate IRmin_EA12_logirate IRmax_EA12_logirate
IRB_EU12_logirate IRmin_EU12_logirate IRmax_EU12_logirate











GDP       
per      
capita 
Revenues 
to        
GDP 
Expenditures 
to             
GDP 
Deficit     
to               
GDP 
Number        






Austria 14854 0.49 0.52 -0.03 22 •   
Belgium 14516 0.47 0.52 -0.05 20 •   
Bulgaria 2443 0.38 0.39 -0.01 14   • 
Cyprus 8046 0.37 0.40 -0.03 14   • 
Czech Rep 7810 0.40 0.45 -0.05 13   • 
Denmark 18733 0.53 0.53 0.00 22     
Estonia 6689 0.39 0.38 0.01 15   • 
Finland 15155 0.51 0.50 0.02 22 •   
France 14218 0.49 0.52 -0.03 21 •   
Germany 15202 0.44 0.46 -0.02 16 •   
Greece 7832 0.37 0.46 -0.08 17 •   
Hungary 5067 0.44 0.50 -0.05 14   • 
Ireland 13722 0.38 0.42 -0.04 17 •   
Italy 11908 0.43 0.50 -0.07 22 •   
Latvia 4784 0.35 0.37 -0.02 12   • 
Lithuania 4863 0.34 0.38 -0.04 12   • 
Luxembourg 28758 0.42 0.40 0.02 16 •   
Malta 5678 0.38 0.43 -0.05 14   • 
Netherlands 15295 0.48 0.51 -0.03 22 •   
Poland 4246 0.40 0.45 -0.05 14   • 
Portugal 6392 0.35 0.40 -0.05 22 •   
Romania 2742 0.33 0.36 -0.04 8   • 
Slovakia 6704 0.38 0.45 -0.07 16   • 
Slovenia 12070 0.43 0.47 -0.03 11   • 
Spain 9162 0.38 0.41 -0.03 16 •   
Sweden 17710 0.56 0.57 -0.01 18     
UK 13185 0.41 0.45 -0.04 22     















Table A2: Results of Panel Unit Root Tests 
  Im-Pesaran-Shin   Dickey Fuller   Perron 
  r(N) r(Z) r(p_Z)   r(N) r(Z) r(p_Z)   r(N) r(Z) r(p_Z) 
,i tGDP  1030 -1.53 0.06   1057 1.79 0.96   1057 -0.36 0.36 
,i tEXP  704 -5.06 0.00   731 -4.50 0.00   731 -4.47 0.00 
,i tREV  704 -2.95 0.00   731 -3.24 0.00   731 -0.79 0.22 
,i tINF  515 -4.47 0.00   542 -4.18 0.00   542 -8.56 0.00 
,i tR  704 -4.55 0.00   734 2.38 0.99   734 -2.59 0.00 
,i tTT  1014 -4.61 0.00   1041 -2.27 0.01   1041 -1.79 0.04 
,i tGDP  1003 -13.92 0.00   1030 -19.96 0.00   1030 -19.96 0.00 
,i tEXP  677 -11.93 0.00   704 -17.85 0.00   704 -17.85 0.00 
,i tREV  677 -10.55 0.00   704 -14.23 0.00   704 -14.23 0.00 
,i tINF  488 -8.38 0.00   515 -12.81 0.00   515 -12.81 0.00 
,i tR  677 -13.53 0.00   668 -23.04 0.00   668 -23.04 0.00 
,i tTT  987 -17.78 0.00   1014 -26.90 0.00   1014 -26.90 0.00 































Figure A1: Plotted Cross-Country Percentiles of Residuals from the Pooled VAR Estimation by SURE  
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Figure A2: Robustness Analysis of Baseline Results Using Real GDP Growth Instead of GDP Level.  
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Figure A3: Robustness Analysis of the Applied Lag Length of the PVAR – Using One Lag Instead of Two 
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Figure A4: Robustness Analysis of Shock Identification Assumption -- Government Revenue Ordered Before GDP and Expenditure.  
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